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Depression is a leading cause of disability worldwide, but is often under-diagnosed and under-
treated. One of the tenets of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is that individuals who
are depressed exhibit distorted modes of thinking, so-called cognitive distortions, which can
negatively affect their emotions and motivation. Here, we show that individuals with a self-
reported diagnosis of depression on social media express higher levels of distorted thinking
than a random sample. Some types of distorted thinking were found to be more than twice
as prevalent in our depressed cohort, in particular Personalizing and Emotional Reasoning.
This effect is specific to the distorted content of the expression and can not be explained
by the presence of specific topics, sentiment, or first-person pronouns. Our results point
towards the detection, and possibly mitigation, of patterns of online language that are gen-
erally deemed depressogenic. They may also provide insight into recent observations that
social media usage can have a negative impact on mental health.
1 Introduction
Depression is a leading contributor to the burden of disability worldwide1, 2, with some evidence
that disability attributed to depression is rising, particularly among youth3, 4. A key challenge in
reducing the prevalence of depression has been that it is often under-recognized5 as well as under-
treated6. Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), is the most widely researched psychotherapy for
depression. It is equivalent to antidepressant medications in its short-term efficacy and evidences
superior outcomes in the long-term7, 8. The cognitive theory underlying CBT argues that the ways
in which individuals process and interpret information about themselves and their world is directly
related to the onset, maintenance, and recurrence of their depression9, 10. This model is consistent
with information processing accounts of mood regulation11 and its dynamics12, as well as basic
research that supports the role of cognitive reappraisal and language in emotion regulation13–16.
In CBT, therapists work with their clients to identify depressogenic thinking patterns by iden-
tifying lexical or verbal markers of rigid, distorted, or overly negative interpretations17, 18. For
example, statements that include “should” or “must” are often challenged as reflecting overly rigid
rules about the world (“I shouldn’t be lazy”, “I must never fail”). This process often entails a se-
ries of conversations with the client to uncover and address statements that reflect these so-called
Cogntive Distortions (CD).
The idea that language is predictive of depression is supported by data-driven approaches de-
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tecting depression from various lexical markers including the use of language to describe negative
emotions19, 20, the use of first-person pronouns21–24, and mentions of common symptoms25. Ma-
chine learning approaches have been shown to successfully predict whether Facebook users suffer
from depression26, 27, identifying the most useful lexical markers to render a prediction. These
results, while useful for prediction and the detection of depression, do not offer insights into the
cognitive dynamics of the disease pattern, nor its relationship to language, which is crucial in
developing treatments and interventions.
Here, we emphloy a theory-driven approach to studying depressive language on Twitter. Rather
than attemphting to extract relevant text features from text data, e.g. “sleep”, “health”, or other
mental health related features, we define a clinical lexicon of 241 n-grams28 that a panel of clinical
psychologists deemed to form a schema involved in the expression of a particular type of distorted
thinking according to CBT theory and practice. For example, “I will never ” would be implicated
in the expression of a cognitive distortions such as Catastrophizing or Fortune-telling, whereas “I
am a ” would be used to express a Labeling and Mislabeling distortion.
We then compare the longitudinal prevalence of this set of Cognitive Distortion Schemata
(CDS) in the language of a large cohort of depressed individuals vs. a random sample on social
media (Twitter). Our results indicate significantly higher prevalence of most types of CDS in the
Depressed cohort, both at the within-subjects and between-groups level. Particularly CDS in the
Personalizing and Emotional Reasoning types occur approximately 2.3 times more frequently in
the online language of Depressed users. Our results are robust to changes in our user sample,
our choice of CDS n-grams, text sentiment, and the known propensity of Depressed individuals to
make self-referential statements.
Cognitive distortion types and n-gram schemata Aaron T. Beck introduced the concept of cog-
nitive distortions to characterize the thinking of individuals with depression29, 30. Subsequently,
other clinicians expanded on his typology of distortions31, including most recently his daughter,
clinical psychologist and CBT expert, Judith Beck32. We drew upon these latest lists to identify 12
types of cognitive distortions that may characterize the thinking of individuals who are depressed.
We defined 241 CDS n-grams in total, each expressing at least 1 type of cognitive distortion
(see Appendix Table 7). The schemata in each category were formulated to capture the “mini-
mal semantic building blocks” of expressing distorted thinking for the particular type, avoiding
expressions that are specific to a depression-related topics, such as poor sleep or health issues.
For example, the 3-gram “I am a” was included as a building block of expressing Labeling and
Mislabeling, because it would be a highly likely (and nearly unavoidable) n-gram to express many
self-referential (“I”) expressions of labeling (“am a”) (for an example see Table 1). Where possi-
ble, higher-order n-grams were chosen to capture as much of the semantic structure of one or more
distorted schemata as possible, e.g. the 3-gram “everyone will believe” captures both Overgen-
eralizing and Mindreading. We did include 1-grams such as “nobody” and “everybody” in spite
of their prevalence in common language, since they strongly correspond to the expression of Di-
chotomous Reasoning. Table 2 shows the number of schemata per category in our CDS set along
with the average n-gram size, and a number of relevant grammatical features. The complete set of
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Cognitive Distortion Types
Category Definition Examples
Catastrophizing Exaggerating the importance of negative events ”The evening will be a disaster”
Dichotomous Reasoning Thinking that an inherently continuous situation can
only fall into two categories
“No one will ever like me.”
Disqualifying the Positive Unreasonably discounting positive experiences “OK but1 my grade was not that good.2”
Emotional Reasoning Thinking that something is true based on how one
feels, ignoring the evidence to the contrary
“My grades are good but it still feels1 like I
will fail2.”
Fortune-telling Making predictions, usually negative ones, about the
future.
“Whatever I try I will not be successful”
Labeling and Mislabeling Labeling yourself or others while discounting evi-
dence that could lead to less disastrous conclusions
“I am a1 total2 loser3.”
Magnification and Minimization Magnifying negative aspects or minimizing positive
aspects
“My good grades are really not important.”
Mental Filtering Paying too much attention to negative details instead
of the whole picture
“If I only worked harder, I would be more
successful.”
Mindreading Believing you know what others are thinking “Everyone believes1 I am a2 failure3.”
Overgeneralizing Making sweeping negative conclusions based on a
few examples
“Nobody ever cares for me.”
Personalizing Believing others are behaving negatively because of
oneself, without considering more plausible or exter-
nal explanations for behavior
“Everyone thinks1 I am a loser2 for calling
her.”
Should Statements Having a fixed idea on how you and/or others should
behave
“I have to1 to do this or I will not2 make it
to the weekend.”
Table 1: Common cognitive distortions identified in CBT for depression32. We provide examples of how
Cognitive Distortion Schemata (CDS) can be embedded in common expressions (bold). Contractions are
expanded. Numbers indicate where the example contains more than one CDS.
CD schemata is provided in Table 7 in the Appendix.
We note that a significant sub-set of the CDS do not occur in the Twitter content for both
cohorts (see Table 2: N∃), indicating that parts of our set of CDS are “lexically exhaustive” with
respect to capturing the major modes of CD expression in natural language.
Depressed and random sample We identified a cohort of social media users that had self-reported
a clinical diagnosis of depression by posting a variant of the explicit statement “I was diagnosed
with depression” (see “Materials and Methods”). To make sure we were only including truly
self-referential statements of diagnosis of depression, 3 of the authors manually removed quotes,
retweets, jokes, and external references. Note that we exclude all diagnosis statements themselves
from our analysis, including all tweets that contain the term “diagnos” and “depress”. We also
examine the sensitivity of our results to the propensity of this cohort to make similar self-referential
statements (see “Absence of personal pronoun effect.”)
With this final set of adjudicated diagnosis tweets, we harvested the maximum number of
tweets allowed by the Twitter API (the most recent 3200) for each individual, resulting in a sam-
ple of 1,207 users and their 1,759,644 tweets (ranging from May 2008 to September 2018). We
refer to this cohort as “Depressed”, but acknowledge that we have no independent confirmation
of their present mental health state. We also established a baseline sample of randomly chosen
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Significant N Avg. Length Pronouns
CD Category NCD N∃ N∗ N∗r (%) n¯ Pr (%)
Catastrophizing 11 10 2 18.2 3.000 /
Dichotomous Reasoning 23 23 16 69.6 1.347 /
Disqualifying the Positive 14 13 4 28.6 2.286 7.1
Emotional Reasoning 7 7 6 85.7 2.857 85.7
Fortune-telling 8 8 8 100.0 3.125 87.5
Labeling and Mislabeling 44 44 20 45.5 2.273 36.4
Magnification and Minimization 8 8 4 50.0 2.000 /
Mental Filtering 14 14 3 21.4 2.786 50.0
Mindreading 72 62 9 12.5 3.167 83.3
Overgeneralizing 21 21 14 66.7 2.762 57.1
Personalizing 14 14 9 64.3 2.429 100.0
Should Statements 5 5 2 40.0 1.400 /
Total 241 229 97 40.2 2.585 51.0
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of our set of Cognitive Distortion Schemata which are grouped in 12 types
(“CD Category”). Column NCD indicates the number of schemata in the specific category. Mindreading is
the largest category because it contains many grammatical variations of the same schema, e.g. “I/you/they
will think”. The N∃ column shows the number of n-grams in each category that were actually found in our
Twitter data. The N∗ and N∗r columns show respectively the number and ratio of n-grams in the category
for which we found a statistically significantly higher prevalence in the Depressed than the Random Sample
cohort. n¯ is the average length (n) of each n-gram in the category. Column Pr shows the ratio of CDS in
each category that contain a first-person pronoun. / indicates the absence of any CDS with the feature.
individuals with a similar distribution of account creation dates as the Depressed cohort to account
for changes in user behavior and platform effects. Here too we exclude all tweets that contain the
terms “diagnos” and “depress” from subsequent analysis. Our “Random Sample” cohort contains
8,791 individuals and a total 8,498,574 tweets (see “Materials and Methods”).
2 Results
We first compare the within-subject prevalence of the established set of CDS between the De-
pressed and Random Sample cohorts. For each individual we count how many of their tweets
contained any of the 241 CDS and divide it by their total number of tweets, resulting in an in-
dividual within-subject CD prevalence (see “Materials and Methods”). The density distribution
of individual prevalence values can then be compared between Depressed and Random Sample
individuals as shown in Fig. 1. We restrict this analysis to individuals with at least 150 tweets so
that we have sufficient data to determine prevalence reliably, but retain all individuals in subse-
quent between-groups analyses since the latter does not require the calculation of within-subject
prevalence values.
We observe that the distribution of within-subject CDS prevalence is shifted significantly to the
right for the Depressed cohort relative to that of the Random Sample, indicating that individuals
in the Depressed cohort express significantly more CDS. Note that 0.487% of the Random Sample
individuals have no tweets with CDS whereas the Depressed sample has no cases without CDS.
Results from a Two-Sample KolmogorovSmirnov test (p < 0.0001) indicate that we can reject the
null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same distribution.
4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Ratio of Tweets
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Us
er
 D
en
sit
y
Depressed
Random Sample
Figure 1: Density of within-subject prevalence of tweets containing CDS for individuals with at least 150
tweets shows a greater number of individuals with high CDS levels in the Depressed than in the Random
Sample cohort. The results of a two-sample KS test allows us to reject the null-hypothesis that the two
distributions are drawn from the same sample (Nd = 1100 (depressed), Nr = 6151 (random), p = 1.036×
10−45).
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Figure 2: Density of bootstrapped between-groups Prevalence Ratios, with median (µ50 = 1.19) and 95%
Confidence Intervals (CI) [1.16, 1.22] between the Depressed and Random Sample cohort (see Table 3: “All
CDs”). The 95% CI of the distribution does not include 1.00 (vertical line) indicating a significantly higher
prevalence of all CDS for the Depressed cohort (1.2×).
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Furthermore, we conduct a between-groups analysis to compare the prevalence of CDS be-
tween the Depressed vs. the Random Sample cohort. We do so by calculating the Prevalence of
CDS for all tweets from each cohort and calculating the Prevalence Ratio (PR) between the two
cohorts (see Materials and Methods “Prevalence Ratio”). A Prevalence Ratio significantly larger
than 1 indicates that the presence of CDS in the tweets written by the Depressed cohort is greater
than the Random Sample cohort. To assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in our cohort
samples, we repeatedly calculate the estimated PR value over 10,000 random re-samples (with
replacement) of both groups, resulting in a distribution of PR values shown in Fig. 2 (see Materials
and Methods “Bootstrapping”). Note, Prevalence Ratios express the relative difference between
the 2 cohorts, not the absolute difference which is provided in Appendix Table 6.
We observe in Fig. 2 that the median of this distribution of PR values is significantly larger
than 1 (and its 95% confidence intervals does not include 1), indicating that we find a statistically
significant higher prevalence of CDS in the Depressed cohort (1.2×) than in the Random Sample,
and that this result is robust to random changes in our cohorts.
PRA PR1 PRC
median 95% CI median 95% CI median 95% CI
PD  PR
All CDS 1.186∗ [1.157, 1.216] 1.169∗ [1.140, 1.197] 1.220∗ [1.160, 1.310]
Personalizing 2.402∗ [2.242, 2.576] / / 2.412∗ [1.671, 2.957]
Emotional Reasoning 2.323∗ [2.049, 2.639] 2.065∗ [1.702, 2.485] 2.317∗ [2.012, 3.184]
Overgeneralizing 1.580∗ [1.501, 1.661] 1.486∗ [1.409, 1.566] 1.574∗ [1.369, 1.734]
Mental Filtering 1.468∗ [1.291, 1.656] 1.346∗ [1.069, 1.660] 1.470∗ [1.173, 1.919]
Labeling and Mislabeling 1.328∗ [1.267, 1.391] 1.204∗ [1.144, 1.268] 1.319∗ [1.156, 1.478]
Disqualifying the Positive 1.349∗ [1.210, 1.498] 1.349∗ [1.210, 1.498] 1.346∗ [1.176, 1.555]
Dichotomous Reasoning 1.195∗ [1.163, 1.226] 1.195∗ [1.163, 1.226] 1.216∗ [1.158, 1.303]
Mindreading 1.136∗ [1.060, 1.230] 1.136∗ [1.060, 1.229] 1.129 [0.808, 1.274]
Should Statements 1.103∗ [1.050, 1.153] 1.103∗ [1.050, 1.153] 1.100 [0.836, 1.409]
Magnification and Minimization 1.075∗ [1.023, 1.130] 1.075∗ [1.023, 1.130] 1.078∗ [1.016, 1.472]
PD  PR Fortune-telling 0.954 [0.837, 1.075] 0.586 [0.483, 0.698] 0.944 [0.501, 1.288]Catastrophizing 0.729 [0.554, 0.902] 0.729 [0.554, 0.902] 0.718 [0.654, 1.062]
Table 3: Prevalence Ratio (PR) and 95% CIs of CDS between the Depressed and Random Sample cohort.
PR values  1 indicate a significantly higher prevalence in the Depressed sample (marked by ∗). Values
are calculated under 3 distinct conditions, labeled PRA: values for the entire set of CDS, PR1: values for
CDS without first-person pronouns (“I”,“me”, “my”, “mine”, and “myself”), and PRC : values with a 95%
CI resulting from resampling the CDS, instead of our sample of individuals (see Materials and Methods).
Appendix Table 6 provides absolute Prevalence Differences.
The between-groups PR values shown in Fig. 2 do not reflect specific distortion types; all CDS
are equally and independently matched to all tweets. Total CDS prevalence over all tweets is 21.8%
and 18.407% for the Depressed and Random Sample cohort respectively but differs significantly
for each CD type (See Appendix Table 5). It is reasonable to expect that the different types of CDS
may differ in their prevalence between our cohorts. We therefore repeat the above analysis, with
CDS separated by CD type (see Table 2).
As shown in Table 3 and Fig. 3, the prevalence of CDS is significantly higher for nearly all CD
types in the tweets of the Depressed cohort than those of the Random Sample with Prevalence Ratio
values ranging from 2.4× to 1.1×, with the exception of Catastrophizing and Fortune-telling, with
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Figure 3: Comparison of Cognitive Distortion Schemata (CDS) Prevalence Ratios between the Depressed
and Random Sample cohort for each cognitive distortion type. Black dots indicate the boundaries of the 95%
CI. The medians are indicated by a green, yellow, or red diamond respectively corresponding to a higher
prevalence in the Depressed, no difference, or higher prevalence among the Random Sample respectively.
The Depressed cohort showed a significantly higher use of CDS than the Random Sample cohort for all
CD types combined (“All CDS”) and most CDS types separately (PR 1) with the exception of Fortune-
telling and Catastrophizing. Please see Table 3 for more details about the Prevalence Ratios.
the latter not producing a PR significantly different from parity. The CD types Personalizing and
Emotional Reasoning have the greatest PR values of 2.4× and 2.3×, followed by Overgeneralizing
(1.6×), Mental Filtering (1.5×), Labeling and Mislabeling (1.3×), and Disqualifying the positive
(1.3×). The CD types Mind Reading, Should Statements, and Magnification and Minimization
have lower yet significant PR values of 1.1×. Table 2 “Significant N” shows the number and ratios
of schemata for each CD type that have PR values significantly different from parity.
The PR individual CDS n-grams can differ significantly as well. Appendix Fig. 6 shows the
contributions of each individual CDS n-gram separately. Table 4 shows the CDS with the individu-
ally highest and lowest PR values to illustrate the CDS that are most prevalent in the Depressed and
Random Sample cohort respectively. As shown, the highest ranked CDS for the Depressed cohort
belong to the Mindreading, Emotional Reasoning, and Personalizing type, whereas the highest
ranked CDS for the Random Sample belong to the non-reflexive Mindreading and Fortune-telling
type.
Absence of sentiment effect Previous research has shown that the language of depressed individu-
als is less positive (lower text valence) and contains higher levels of self-referential language19, 33–37.
To determine the degree to which our results can be explained by text sentiment or self-referential
statements instead of distorted thinking, we examine the valence loadings of our collection of
tweets and CDS, and reproduce our results with and without CDS containing self-referential state-
ments.
First, we determine the valence values of each CDS n-gram in our set using the VADER senti-
ment analysis tool38 which in a recent survey was shown to outperform other available sentiment
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PR rank Depressed Random Sample
1 everyone will think we know
2 since it feels they will not
3 I caused he believes
4 will go wrong we believe
5 because of my we will not
6 because I feel she will not
7 all my fault an incompetent
8 a burden that will not
9 because my we will know
10 I am always we do not know
Table 4: Ten CDS with highest individual PR values between the Depressed and Random Sample cohorts to
illustrate most prevalent n-grams in online language of either cohort.
analysis tools for social media language39. VADER is particularly appropriate for this use, since its
sentiment ratings take into account grammatical context, such as negation, hedging, and boosting.
We find that 75.9% of our CDS have either no sentiment-loaded content or are rated to have zero
valence (neutral sentiment scores). The average valence rating of all CDS is−0.05(N = 241) on a
scale from −1.0 to +1.0. Fig. 4A shows the VADER sentiment distribution of only CDS n-grams
with non-zero ratings. Here we observe only a slight negative skew of CDS sentiment for this
small minority of CDS n-grams (24.1%).
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Figure 4: (A) Density of Vader scores for CDS with non-zero sentiment values (24.1% of 241 schemata).
Most CDS carried no valence loading (75.9%). The average rating for the complete set CDS is -0.05
(N=241). (B) Density of VADER valence ratings for all individual tweets posted by the Depressed and
Random Sample cohorts, indicating a significant right-hand skew towards positive sentiment for both. The
Depressed cohort has more extreme positive and negative sentiment than the Random Sample (blue line
vs. orange bars). The results of a two-sample KS test allows us to reject the null-hypothesis that the two
sentiment distributions are drawn from the same distribution (p < 0.0001).
Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 4B, the sentiment distributions of all tweets for the Depressed
and Random Sample cohorts are both skewed towards positive sentiment (right side of distribu-
tion). This matches earlier findings that human language exhibits a so-called Polyanna effect40, a
near-universal phenomenon that skews human language towards positive valence. Surprisingly, we
find no indications that the tweets of the Depressed cohort carry more negative valence than those
of the Random Sample cohort. To the contrary, VADER sentiment ratings in the range [0.70, 1.00]
seem to be slightly more prevalent among the tweets of the Depressed cohort (see Fig. 4B), possi-
bly indicating an increased emotionality (higher levels of both negative and positive affect). One
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particular deviation in the sentiment range of [0.40, 0.45] was found to be uniquely associated with
the Random Sample cohort using the “Face With Tears of Joy” emoji (VADER sentiment=0.4404)
more often than the Depressed cohort. A two-sample KS test allows us to reject the null-hypothesis
that the two distributions are drawn from the same sample (p < 0.00011).
Combined, these findings strongly suggest that the higher prevalence of CDS in the language
of the Depressed cohort can neither be attributed to a negative valence skew in the CDS set, nor
the sentiment distribution of the tweets produced by either the Depressed and Random Sample
cohorts.
Absence of personal pronoun effect Research has shown that First-Person Pronouns (FPP) are
more prevalent in the language of depressed individuals19, 22. Since many CDS contain FPPs (see
Table 2 “Pronouns”), our results may to a degree reflect this phenomenon instead of the “distorted”
nature of our CDS. To test the sensitivity of our results to the presence of FPPs in our set of CDS,
we repeat our analysis entirely without CDS that contain the FPPs “I” (upper-case), “me”, “my”,
“mine”, and “myself”. As shown in Table 3: PR1, we find that their removal does not significantly
alter the observed effect. The respective confidence intervals resulting from our removal of FPP
schemata change, but most overlap with those obtained from an analysis that includes the full set of
CDS (see Table 3: PRA vs Table 3: PR1). This demonstrates that our observations are not a product
of the presence of first-person pronouns in our set of CDS. Note that we could not determine any
values for Personalizing because its CDS all contain first-person pronouns (see Appendix Fig. 5).
Robustness to CDS changes To determine the sensitivity of our results to the particular choice
of CDS, we re-calculated PR values between the Depressed and Random Sample cohorts, but
instead of re-sampling our Depressed and Random Sample cohort, we randomly re-sampled (with
replacement) the set of 241 CDS n-gram. The 95% CI of the resulting distribution of PR values
then indicates how sensitive our results are to random changes of our CDS set. The results of
this analysis are shown in Table 3: PRC . We observe slight changes in the dispersion of the
resulting distribution of PR values, but the median values and 95% CIs remain largely unchanged.
As before, the 95% CIs continue to exclude 1.000 for all CD types, except Mindreading, Should
Statements, Fortune-telling, and Catastrophizing, and we can continue to reject the null-hypothesis
that PR values are similar between the Depressed and Random Sample cohort for nearly all CD
types. Furthermore, as shown in Table 3, the 95% CIs of PRC and PRA largely overlap across all
CD types indicating our results are robust to random changes of our cohort samples as well as our
CDS set.
3 Discussion
In an online sample of individuals, we emphloyed a theory-driven approach to measure linguistic
markers that may indicate cognitive vulnerability to depression, according to CBT theory. We
defined a set of Cognitive Distortion Schemata (CDS) that we grouped along 12 widely accepted
types of distorted thinking and compared their prevalence between two cohorts of Twitter users:
one of individuals who self-identified as having received a clinical diagnosis of depression and the
1Value is below 32byte floating point precision.
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other a similar random sample.
As hypothesized, the Depressed cohort use significantly more CDS of distorted thinking in
their online language than the Random Sample, particularly schemata associated with Personaliz-
ing and Emotional Reasoning. We observed significantly elevated levels of CDS across nearly all
CD types, sometimes more than twice as much, but did not find a statistically significant elevated
prevalance among the Depressed cohort for two specific types, namely Fortune-telling and Catas-
trophizing. This may be due to the difficulty of capturing these specific cognitive distortions in the
form of a set of 1 to 5-grams as their expression in language can involve an interactive process of
conversation and interpretation. Of note, our findings are not explained by the use of first-person
pronouns or more negatively loaded language, both of which had been identified in past research
as markers of depressed individuals. These results shed a light on how depression may affect
public discourse on social media, but also reveals the degree to which depressogenic language is
manifested in the colloquial language of social media platforms. This is of social relevance given
that these platforms are specifically designed to propagate information through the social ties that
connect individuals on a global scale.
An advantage of studying theory-driven differences between the language of depressed and
non-depressed individuals, as opposed to a purely data-driven or machine learning approach, is
that we can explicitly use the principles underpinning CBT to understand the cognitive and lexi-
cal components that may shape depression. Cognitive behavioral therapists have developed a set
of strategies to challenge the distorted thinking that is characteristic of depression. Preliminary
findings suggest that specific language can be related to specific therapeutic practices and seems
to be related to outcomes41. These practices, however, have largely been shaped by a clinical un-
derstanding and not necessarily informed by objective measures of how patterns of language can
determine the path of recovery.
Our results suggest a path for mitigation and intervention, including applications that engage
individuals suffering from mood disorders such as major depressive disorder via social media plat-
forms and that challenge particular expressions and types of depressogenic language. Future char-
acterizations of the relations between depressogenic language and mood may aid in the develop-
ment of automated interventions (e.g., “chatbots”) or suggest promising targets for psychotherapy.
Another approach that has shown promise in leveraging social media for the treatment of mental
health problems involves “crowdsourcing” the responses to cognitively-distorted content42.
Several limitations of our theory-driven approach should be considered. First, we rely on self-
reported depression diagnoses on social media which have not been independently verified by a
clinician. However, the potential inaccuracy of this inclusion criterion would reduce the observed
effect sizes (PR values between cohorts) due to the larger heterogeneity of our cohorts. Conse-
quently, our results are likely not an artifact of the accuracy of our inclusion criterion. Second, our
lexicon of CDS was composed and approved by a panel of 9 experts who may have been only par-
tially successful in capturing all n-grams used to express distorted ways of thinking. Nevertheless,
a significant portion of CDS in our set did not occur in our collections of Twitter content, indicat-
ing the scope of our lexicon exceeds that of common online language. On a related note, the use
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of CDS n-grams implies that we measure distorted thinking by proxy, namely via language, and
our observations may be therefore be affected by linguistic and cultural factors. Common idiosyn-
cratic or idiomatic expressions may syntactically represent a distorted form of thinking, but no
longer do in practice. For example, an expression such as “literally the worst” may be commonly
emphloyed to express dismay, without necessarily involving the speaker experiencing a distorted
mode of thinking. Third, both cohorts were sampled from Twitter, a leading social media platform,
whose use may be associated with higher levels of psychopathology and reduced well-being43–45.
We may thus be observing elevated or biased rates of distorted thinking in both cohorts as a result
of platform effects. However, we report relative prevalence numbers with respect to a carefully
construed random sample, which likely compensates for this effect. Furthermore, recent analysis
indicates that representative samples with respect to psychological phenomena can be obtained
from social media content46. This is an important discussion in computational social science that
will continue to be investigated. Data-driven approaches that analyze natural language in real-time
will continue to complement theory-driven work such as ours.
4 Materials and Methods
Data and sample construction Using the Twitter Application Program Interface (API) and the
IUNI OSoMe47 (a service which provides searchable access to the Twitter “Gardenhose”, a 10%
sample of all daily tweets), we search for tweets that matched both “diagnos*” and “depress*.” The
resulting set of tweets are then filtered for matching the expressions “i”, “diagnos*”, “depres*” in
that order in a case-insensitive manner allowing insertions to match the greatest variety of diagnosis
statements, e.g. a tweet that states “I was in fact just diagnosed with clinical depression” would
match. Finally, to ensure we are only including true self-referential statements of a depression
diagnosis, a team of 3 experts manually removed quotes, jokes, and external references. For each
qualifying diagnosis tweet we retrieve the timeline of the corresponding Twitter user using the
Twitter user timeline API endpoint 2. Subsequently, we remove all non-English tweets (Twitter
API machine-detected“lang” field), all retweets, and tweets that contain “diagnos*” or “depress*”,
but not a valid diagnosis statement. The resulting Depressed cohort contains 1,207 individuals and
1,759,644 tweets ranging from from May 2008 to September 2018.
To compare CDS prevalence rates of the Depressed cohort to a baseline, we construct a Ran-
dom Sample cohort of individuals. To do so, we collect a large sample of random tweets in 3
weeks (i.e. September 1-8, 2017, March 1-8, 2018, and September 1-8, 2018) from the IUNI
OSOME47. We extract all Twitter user identifiers from these tweets (N=588,356), and retain only
those that specified their geographical location and were not already included in our Depressed
cohort. To equalize platform, interface, and behavioral changes over time, we select a sub-sample
of these individuals such that the distribution of their account creation dates matches those of the
Depressed cohort, resulting in an initial set of 9,525 random individuals. Finally, we harvested the
Twitter timelines of these users and filtered the obtained data in the same way as described for the
Depressed cohort. Since some user data was found to be no longer publicly available and others
2https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/timelines/api-reference/
get-statuses-user_timeline
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have no tweets left after our filters, our final Random Sample Cohort consists of 8,791 individuals
and a total 8,498,574 tweets.
The code and data used in this analysis are freely available at https://github.com/
kbathina/CDs_Depressed_Twitter. Upon reasonable request we will provide all Twitter
user IDs and tweet IDs to reproduce our results.
Prevalence Ratios For each Twitter user u in our sample, we retrieved a timeline Tu of their time-
ordered k most recent tweets, Tu = {t1, t2, · · · , tk}. We also defined a set C = {c1, c2, · · · , cN} of
n-grams where N = 241 (see Table 2) with varying n ∈ [1, 5] number of terms. The elements of
set C are intended to represent the lexical building blocks of expressing cognitive distortions (see
Table 2 and Appendix Table 7). We introduce a CDS matching function FC(t) → {0, 1}, which
maps each individual tweet t to either 0 or 1 according to whether a tweet t contains one or more
of the schemata in set C. Note that the range of FC(t) is binary, thus a tweet that contains more
than one CDS still counts as 1.
The within-subject prevalence of tweets for individual u is defined as the ratio of tweets that
contain a CDS in C over all tweets in their timeline Tu:
PC(u) =
∑
t∈Tu FC(t)
|Tu|
Our sample is separated into two cohorts: one of 1,207 Depressed and another of 8,791 Ran-
dom Sample individuals. We denote the set of all individuals in the depressed cohort D =
{u1, u2, · · · , u1207} and random sample cohort R = {u1, u2, · · · , u8791}. Hence, the sets of all
tweets written by users in the Depressed and Random Sample cohorts are defined as:
TD =
⋃
u∈D
Tu and TR =
⋃
u∈R
Tu (1)
We can then define the Prevalence (P ) of tweets with CDS C for each the Depressed (D) and
Random Sample (RS) cohorts as follows:
PC(D) =
∑
t∈TD FC(t)
|TD| PC(R) =
∑
t∈TR FC(t)
|TR| (2)
or, informally, the ratio of tweets that contain any CDS over all tweets written by the individuals
of that cohort.
Consequently, the Prevalence Ratio (PR) of CDS in set C between the two cohorts D and R,
denoted PRC(D,R), is defined simply as the ratio of their respective CDS prevalence PC(TD) and
PC(TR) in the tweet sets TD and Tr respectively:
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PRc(D,R) =
PC(D)
PC(R)
(3)
If PRC(D,R) ' 1 the prevalence of CDS in the tweets of the depression cohort are comparable
to their prevalence in the tweets of the random sample. However, any value PRC(D,R)  1 or
PRC(D,R)  1 may indicate a significantly higher prevalence in each respective cohort. Here
we use 1 and 1 to signifiy that a PR value is significantly higher or lower than 1 respectively,
which we asses by whether its 95% CI includes 1 or not (see Bootstrapping below).
Bootstrapping estimates The estimated Prevalence and Prevalence Ratio can vary with the par-
ticular composition of either our set C (CDS n-grams) or the set of individuals in our Depressed
and Random Sample cohorts, respectively D and R. We verify the reliability of our results by
randomly re-sampling either C or both D and R, with replacement. This is repeated B = 10000
number of times, leading to a set of re-sampled CD sets or cohort samples. Each of these B num-
ber of re-samples of either (1) the set of CDS C or (2) or the sets D and C of all individuals in
our Depressed and Random Sample cohorts results in B number of corresponding Prevalence or
Prevalence Ratio values:
P ∗ = {P ∗1 , P ∗2 , · · · , P ∗B}, PR∗ = {PR∗1, PR∗2, · · · , PR∗B} (4)
The distributions of P ∗ and PR∗ are then characterized by their median (µ50) and their 95% con-
fidence interval ([µ2.5, µ97.5]). A 95% confidence interval of a PR that does not contain 1 is held to
indicate a significant difference in prevalence between the two cohorts.
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Appendix
PC(D) (%) PC(R) (S%)
All CDs 21.838 18.407
Dichotomous Reasoning 16.650 13.933
Should statements 3.191 2.896
Magnification and Minimization 1.992 1.851
Labeling and mislabeling 1.199 0.903
Mindreading 1.168 1.026
Personalizing 1.026 0.427
Overgeneralizing 0.752 0.476
Disqualifying the Positive 0.081 0.060
Emotional Reasoning 0.053 0.023
Fortune-telling 0.047 0.050
Mental Filtering 0.024 0.016
Catastrophizing 0.014 0.019
Table 5: Raw CDS Prevalence in tweets from the Depressed and Random Sample cohorts in decreasing rank
order.
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Figure 5: Prevalence Ratio of CD markers without First-Person Pronouns (FPP) for each type of cognitive
distortion between the Depressed and Random Sample cohort. The two black dots represent the 2.5th and
97.5th percentile of the bootstrapped distribution of means. The diamonds indicate the location of the
median, with green, yellow, and red diamonds indicating Prevalence Ratio values significantly higher than
parity (1) for the Depressed cohort, no significant difference from parity (yellow), and sigfificantly lower
prevalence for the Depressed cohort than the Random Sample (red). Catastrophizing and Fortune-telling
are significantly more prevalent in the Random Sample population ( 1) while the other types of CDS are
more significant in the Depressed cohort ( 1).
PDA PD1 PDC
median 95% CI median 95% CI median 95% CI
PD  PR
All CDs 3.431∗ [2.912, 3.939] 3.069∗ [2.568, 3.561] 0.021∗ [0.013, 0.031]
Dichotomous Reasoning 2.714∗ [2.293, 3.130] 2.714∗ [2.294, 3.130] 0.143∗ [0.072, 0.231]
Personalizing 0.599∗ [0.537, 0.663] / / 0.041∗ [0.003, 0.110]
Overgeneralizing 0.276∗ [0.242, 0.311] 0.177∗ [0.151, 0.203] 0.013∗ [0.003, 0.025]
Labeling and Mislabeling 0.296∗ [0.244, 0.349] 0.146∗ [0.104, 0.189] 0.007∗ [0.002, 0.013]
Should Statements 0.297∗ [0.149, 0.436] 0.297∗ [0.149, 0.436] 0.060 [-0.050, 0.213]
Mindreading 0.140∗ [0.063, 0.233] 0.140∗ [0.063, 0.233] 0.002 [-0.001, 0.007]
Magnification and Minimization 0.139∗ [0.043, 0.235] 0.139∗ [0.043, 0.235] 0.018∗ [0.004, 0.033]
Emotional Reasoning 0.030∗ [0.025, 0.036] 0.006∗ [0.004, 0.008] 0.004∗ [0.001, 0.009]
Disqualifying the Positive 0.021∗ [0.013, 0.029] 0.021∗ [0.013, 0.029] 0.001∗ [0.000, 0.003]
Mental Filtering 0.008∗ [0.005, 0.010] 0.002∗ [0.000, 0.004] 0.001∗ [0.000, 0.001]
PD  PR Fortune-telling -0.002 [-0.009, 0.003] -0.012 [-0.017, -0.008] -0.000 [-0.002, 0.003]Catastrophizing -0.005 [-0.010, -0.002] -0.005 [-0.010, -0.002] -0.000 [-0.001, 0.000]
Table 6: Prevalence Difference (PD) percentages for set of CDS C, defined as (PC(D) − PC(R)) × 100,
and its 95% CIs between the Depressed and Random Sample cohort. PD values 0 indicate a significantly
higher prevalence in the Depressed sample (marked by ∗). Values are calculated under 3 distinct conditions,
labeled PDA: PD percentage difference values for the entire set of CD markers, PD1: PD percentage
difference values for CD markers without first-person pronouns (“I”,“me”, “my”, “mine”, and “myself”),
and PDC : PD percentage values with a 95% CIs resulting from re-sampling the CD marker set 10,000
times, instead of the individuals in the Depressed and Random Sample cohorts (see Main: Materials and
Methods).
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Figure 6: Median and 95% confidence interval of the bootstrapped PR means of CDS n-grams that were
significantly more prevalent, i.e. PR  1 or PR  1, in the Depressed or Random Sample cohort. CDS
n-grams are colored by the type of CD they belong to.
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Category CD Markers
Catastrophizing will fail, will go wrong, will end, will be impossible, will not happen, will be terrible, will
be horrible, will be a catastrophe, will be a disaster, will never end, will not end
Dichotomous Reasoning only, every, everyone, everybody, everything, everywhere, always, perfect, the best, all,
not a single, no one, nobody, nothing, nowhere, never, worthless, the worst, neither, nor,
either or, black or white, ever
Disqualifying the Positive great but, good but, OK but, not that great, not that good, it was not, not all that, fine but,
acceptable but, great yet, good yet, OK yet, fine yet, acceptable yet
Emotional Reasoning but I feel, since I feel, because I feel, but it feels, since it feels, because it feels, still feels
Fortune-telling I will not, we will not , you will not, they will not, it will not, that will not, he will not, she
will not
Labeling and Mislabeling I am a, he is a, she is a, they are a, it is a, that is a, sucks at, suck at, I never, he never,
she never, you never, we never, they never, I am an, he is an, she is an, they are an, it
is an, that is an, a burden, a complete, a completely, a huge, a loser, a major, a total, a
totally, a weak, an absolute, an utter, a bad, a broken, a damaged, a helpless, a hopeless,
an incompetent, a toxic, an ugly, an undesirable, an unlovable, a worthless, a horrible, a
terrible
Magnification and Minimization worst, best, not important, not count, not matter, no matter, the only thing, the one thing
Mental Filtering I see only, all I see, all I can see, can only think, nothing good, nothing right, completely
bad, completely wrong, only the bad, only the worst, if I just, if I only, if it just, if it only
Mindreading everyone believes, everyone knows, everyone thinks, everyone will believe, everyone will
know, everyone will think, nobody believes, nobody knows, nobody thinks, nobody will
believe, nobody will know, nobody will think, he believes, he knows, he thinks, he does not
believe, he does not know, he does not think, he will believe, he will know, he will think,
he will not believe, he will not know, he will not think, she believes, she knows, she thinks,
she does not believe, she does not know, she does not think, she will believe, she will know,
she will think, she will not believe, she will not know, she will not think, they believe, they
know, they think, they do not believe, they do not know, they do not think, they will believe,
they will know, they will think, they will not believe, they will not know, they will not think,
we believe, we know, we think, we do not believe, we do not know, we do not think, we
will believe, we will know, we will think, we will not believe, we will not know, we will
not think, you believe, you know, you think, you do not believe, you do not know, you do
not think, you will believe, you will know, you will think, you will not believe, you will not
know, you will not think
Overgeneralizing all of the time, all of them, all the time, always happens, always like, happens every time,
completely, no one ever, nobody ever, every single one of them, every single one of you, I
always, you always, he always, she always, they always, I am always, you are always, he
is always, she is always, they are always
Personalizing all me, all my, because I, because my, because of my, because of me, I am responsible,
blame me, I caused, I feel responsible, all my doing, all my fault, my bad, my responsibility
Should Statements should, ought, must, have to, has to
Table 7: Cognitive Distortion types and corresponding schemata
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Figure 7: To prevent the calculation of within-subject prevalence values for individuals with too few data
points, we calculate the within-subject prevalence values only for individuals with a given minimum number
of tweets (150). To determine the sensitivity of our results to the chosen value of this threshold, we calculate
the KS-test statistic of the distributions of within-subject CDS prevalence given each threshold value (x-
axis). The blue line shows the KS statistic for the raw prevalence distribution while the orange line shows
the KS statistic for the Probability Distribution Function (PDF). We visually determine an inflection point
in both graphs at 150 minimum tweets at which point the corresponding p-value for the KS-test stabilizes
at 2.8 ∗ 10−45 and 5.8 ∗ 10−3 respectively. Consequently we calculate within-subject prevalence values
only for individuals in either cohort for which we retrieved at least 150 tweets. We can reject the null-
hypothesis that the distributions were drawn from the same population for all threshold values indicating
the conclusions we draw from a comparison of the within-subject CDS prevalences between the Depressed
and the Random Sample cohort are not sensitive to our choice of threshold. It is also important to note that
we do not apply this individual threshold to the calculation of between-group Prevalence Ratios, since this
indicator is calculated at the group level pertaining to millions of tweets and not calculated at the level of
individual users.
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